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ABSTRACT 
In the 2016 election year, the Senate refused to consider President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, maintaining 
that no language in the Appointments Clause imposes an affirmative duty on the Senate to give any nominee a vote 
and that the Senate’s power to refuse consent under that clause implies the authority to determine whether, and under 
what political circumstances, actual consideration of  a nominee should occur.  This Article contends that the text of 
Article II actually provides a surprising level of guidance in discerning the respective powers of  President and Senate 
in the appointment process.  Specifically, it concludes that Article II, Section 2—both understood in whole and in 
its parts—requires the Senate to consider a President’s nominees.  It posits further that the Constitution’s language 
implies some modest, but important, requirements for what Senate consideration must entail.  Specifically, it observes 
that settled understandings of the Senate’s rule-making authority require that the Senate provide a process by which 
a President’s nominee could plausibly be confirmed.  This Article will also examine how the Constitution’s original 
framers, advocates and opponents understood the distribution of power between the branches set forth in the 
Appointments Clause.  By evaluating the instant constitutional problem with primary reference to a semantic analysis 
of the text—and thereafter exploring the reliability of those conclusions with reference to original understandings of 
that text—this Article’s interpretive framework conforms to the interpretive approach fervently preached by Justice 
Scalia and usually praised by the leadership of the 114th Senate.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 2016 election year, the Senate refused to consider President 
Obama’s nominee to replace Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.  That 
now stands as a successful claim of Senate authority over the appointment 
process and an extraordinary partisan victory.  To justify its refusal, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee of the 114th Congress maintained that: (1) no 
language in Article II, Section 2 imposes an affirmative duty on the Senate 
to give any nominee a vote and (2) the Senate’s power to refuse consent 
implies the authority to determine whether, and under what political 
circumstances, actual consideration of a nominee should occur.1 
Specifically, the committee maintained that the advice and consent 
power endowed it with the constitutional authority to “withhold consent on 
any nominee submitted by this President.”2  It further explained that no 
nominee of President Obama’s would receive Senate consideration because 
of the “circumstance” of the vacancy occurring during the presidential 
election year.3  And, it promised to postpone consideration of any nominee 
to ensure that “the American people [would] not [be] deprived of the 
opportunity to engage in a full and robust debate over the type of jurist they 
 
 1 Letter from Hon. Charles E. Grassley, et al., Members of the United States Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, to Hon. Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader (Feb. 23, 2016) [hereinafter 
Grassley Letter]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
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wish to decide some of the most critical issues of our time.”4 
The committee’s letter addressed far more than a dispute about the scope 
of its duty in the event of an election year vacancy.  There, the Senate 
essentially claimed authority under the Appointments Clause5 to decline 
consideration of any nominee of an individual President based on factors 
such as (1) the Senate’s perception of the importance of the appointment or 
(2) the political features of its timing.  A Senate that claims those powers 
captures the authority to indefinitely halt the appointment process, to shift 
the appointment power to a subsequent President, and even to unilaterally 
reduce the size of the Court upon the emergence of a vacancy.  Moreover, a 
Senate that claims the threshold power to decide who will be considered 
functionally usurps part of the President’s nomination power itself. 
The Senate’s remarkable and successful claim raises a multitude of urgent 
questions.  Will the new precedent persistently paralyze our nation’s ability 
to fill judicial vacancies each time a vacancy occurs when the Senate and 
Executive branch are respectively controlled by different parties?  Will the 
precedent be confined to vacancies occurring in the last year of a President’s 
term?  Or, will the Senate majority feel empowered to postpone all 
consideration of a President’s nominees until the next election cycle to secure 
the public’s input?  Will the new precedent—anchored in the procedural 
assumption that the appointment process is, at core, an exercise of factional 
political power—undermine the public perception of the judicial branch as 
a neutral arbiter of the rule of law?  If the new precedent demonstrably 
degrades the functionality and perceived legitimacy of the judiciary, does 
societal respect for the rule of law suffer?  If so, how does that bode for the 
future cohesion of a culturally diverse and politically fractious society? 
It could also be asserted that the questions are not so urgent.  Is there 
really any functional difference between a Senate that refuses to consider a 
nominee and one that conducts a consideration process with no intent to ever 
confirm?  If so, are the questions in the preceding paragraph merely alarmist 
hyperventilation by a faction that lacked sufficient political power to fill a 
vacancy? 
This Article will not purport to answer all of these questions.  But none 
of them can be coherently addressed without a threshold understanding of 
what the United States Constitution requires of the Senate in the 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 In this Article, “the Appointments Clause” will refer to the entirety of the Constitution’s language 
directing the process for appointment found in Article II, Section 2.  References to the Nomination 
Clause, the Advice and Consent Clause, and the Recess Appointments Clause describe subparts of 
the Appointments Clause. 
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appointment process.  At minimum, if the Senate’s claim of authority over 
that process is accepted as constitutionally plausible and therefore lawful, the 
balance of power between the Senate and President in appointing Supreme 
Court Justices will have profoundly changed. 
Just two years before the 2016 nomination crisis, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning.6  There, the Court 
resolved another dispute between the Senate and the President over their 
respective roles in the appointment process.  That case addressed the scope 
of the President’s power to bypass the Senate’s advice and consent authority 
under the Recess Appointments Clause.7  The Court observed that, when 
determining “the allocation of power between two elected branches of 
Government[,] . . . ‘[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration 
of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions’ 
regulating the relationship between Congress and the President.”8  And, the 
Court placed considerable emphasis on historical practice in resolving the 
issues before it. 
Perhaps for this reason, much of the contemporaneous political and 
academic debate surrounding Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination centered 
on the lessons of historical precedent.9  But, the relevant historical paradigm 
can be characterized in a variety of ways.10  Robin Kar and Jason Mazzone 
 
 6 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 7 Id. at 2556–57. 
 8 Id. at 2559 (third alteration in original) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)). 
 9 See, e.g., Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution 
Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 53, 104 (2016); Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President 
Announcing Judge Merrick Garland as his Nominee to the Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/16/remarks-president-
announcing-judge-merrick-garland-his-nominee-supreme (noting recent history of divisiveness in 
the nomination process but also noting the process resulted in confirmed appointees); Roberta 
Rampton, Senator Grassley: ‘Standard Practice’ to Wait on Court Nominee, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2016, 7:37 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-scalia-grassley/senator-grassley-standard-practice-
to-wait-on-court-nominee-idUSKCN0VN00C; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Senate Republicans, Merrick 
Garland and the Lessons of History, HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (June 2, 2016, 09:53 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/the-senate-republicans-merrick-
garland_b_10258520.html. 
 10 The appropriate use of historical gloss to resolve constitutional disputes, and the appropriate historical 
precedents to consider in so doing, are not settled constitutional questions.  See Curtis A. Bradley & 
Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1–65 (comprehensively analyzing competing interpretive theories regarding the use 
of historical gloss to resolve constitutional disputes between the branches).   Indeed, commentators 
have debated whether the appointment process for lower court federal judges could stand as precedent 
for the Garland nomination, how far back analysis of Senate practice should extend, and which prior 
appointment processes are the best analog.  See Kar & Mazzone, supra note 9, at 73–82. 
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conducted the most comprehensive analysis of historical practice and arrived 
at persuasive and coherent conclusions.  Nevertheless, even they conceded 
that “it would . . . be irresponsible to conclude that the Senate Republicans’ 
current plan [to refuse to consider the President’s nominee] definitively 
violates the Constitution . . . or does not violate the Constitution, given the 
evidence and arguments presented [as to historical practice].”11  And, the 
new historical precedent, now established by the Senate’s successful election-
year nullification of a President’s appointment power, has further muddled 
the lessons of past appointment history. 
Academic recourse to historical practice not only failed to provide 
discernable constitutional boundaries after the death of Justice Scalia, it also 
jumped the gun.  That analysis too quickly assumed that the text of the 
Constitution provided no useful guidance in evaluating the scope of the 
Senate’s advice and consent power.  This Article revisits that text.  It aspires 
to review comprehensively whether the Appointments Clause, and other 
pertinent constitutional language, can be harmonized with the Senate’s claim 
of authority.  That review demonstrates that the text of Article II of the 
Constitution provides a surprising level of guidance in discerning the 
respective powers of the Senate and the President in the appointment 
process.  It concludes that Article II, Section 2, both understood in whole 
and in its parts, requires the Senate to consider a President’s nominees.  It 
will posit further that the Constitution’s language implies some modest but 
important requirements for what Senate consideration must entail. 
Specifically, this Article will explain how the 114th Senate’s misreading 
of its textual authority under the Advice and Consent Clause: (1) 
compromises the President’s exclusive power to select nominees; (2) 
contradicts the evident purpose of the Appointments Clause as conveyed by 
its text (the mandatory and prompt appointment of important governmental 
functionaries); (3) bypasses the Constitution’s express prescription for how 
the size of the Court may be altered; (4) overlooks constitutional limitations 
on the Senate’s rule-making authority; and (5) cripples one of the intended 
constitutional checks on the Senate’s power over the appointment process. 
The analysis will consider other features of the Constitution’s text relating 
to appointments including the Recess Appointments Clause.  It will address 
the placement of the appointments clauses in Article II and the Constitution’s 
express endowment of “the executive authority” to the Presidency within 
that article.  These features inform the scope of the Advice and Consent 
Clause.  They demonstrate that the clause cannot be harmonized with the 
 
 11 Kar & Mazzone, supra note 9, at 104. 
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Senate’s claim that the phrase tacitly provides it with such dominant 
authority over the appointment process. 
The textual analysis that follows is consistent with the interpretive 
framework adopted by the Court in Noel Canning.  Although that opinion 
resolved a set of distinct legal questions, it stands as the Court’s most recent 
precedent addressing the respective powers of the President and the Senate 
in the appointment process.  Any complete analysis must account for how 
the Supreme Court might assess the constitutional parameters of a selection 
process for its own membership.12 
Importantly, the Court’s reasoning in Noel Canning does not elevate 
historical practice as the primary arbiter of disputed power.  Rather, such 
history carries “great weight” only when direct constitutional guidance is 
found neither in the plain language of the Constitution, nor from the purpose 
conveyed by that language.13  For this reason, a threshold focus on the 
semantic meaning of pertinent constitutional text, the central project of this 
Article, fully conforms to the Court’s most recent approach in evaluating 
appointment disputes between the branches.14 
To parallel further the Court’s interpretive framework in Noel Canning, 
this Article will examine how the Constitution’s original framers, advocates, 
and opponents understood the distribution of power between the branches 
set forth in the Appointments Clause.  Given the inherent challenges in 
 
 12 This Article does not address whether, or under what circumstances, a dispute regarding the powers 
of the respective branches as to the appointment of Supreme Court justices would be justiciable.  
However, one can conjure plausible scenarios that might make it so.  If a President were to bypass 
a recalcitrant Senate on the theory that the Senate had waived its constitutional opportunity to 
provide advice and consent or if the President were to enforce his own process for securing Senate 
consent in the absence of Senate action, the Court would be squarely faced with the decision of 
whether to seat an appointee arising from such a process.   
 13 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (quoting Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690 
(1929)); id. (quoting State ex rel. Town of Norwalk v. Town of South Norwalk, 58 A. 759, 761 (1904)) 
(observing that historical practice “is entitled to great regard” when constitutional phraseology is 
“of doubtful meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. 
Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1264–65 (2015) (observing 
the majority opinion in Noel Canning seemed to embrace the “proposition, emphasized by Justice 
Scalia . . . that clear text is controlling, regardless of other considerations”). 
 14 In the event the question never reaches the Court, it will be left to the President, the Senate, and 
the voters who elect both, to interpret the Advice and Consent Clause.  But, given the Court’s 
constitutional primacy as the final arbiter of such disputes, the Court’s decisional framework set 
forth in Noel Canning should provide substantial guidance to the other branches and the public.  See 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that it is the duty of the “judicial 
department to say what the law is”); see also Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (adopting the Marbury 
principle for separation-of-powers cases). 
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deriving definitive constitutional meaning from such sources,15 that record is 
presented as confirmatory of, rather than necessary to, the textual analysis. 
The thrust of this inquiry, however, will confine itself to the semantic 
meaning, context, and purpose conveyed by the words of the Constitution.16  
To the extent the following textual analysis persuades, the resulting 
conclusions must carry considerable weight under almost all prevailing 
interpretive theories.  Such theories either (1) posit the construction of text as 
the only mode of understanding constitutional or statutory law that enforces 
fidelity to democratic principles;17 (2) enshrine the text as the best evidence 
of drafters’ intent;18 or (3) place the semantic meaning of the text at the apex 
of a hierarchy of interpretive abstraction.19  Indeed, the dominant theories of 
textual and constitutional interpretation diverge only when textual meaning 
can be reasonably perceived as ambiguous.20  For this reason, inescapable 
understandings of text can theoretically support strong claims: even claims of 
near interpretive unanimity on disputed points of law.21 
 
 
 15 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING 
THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 46–59 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2012) 
(summarizing the interpretive challenges and hazards of exclusive focus on the Framers’ intent). 
 16 As Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel observe, “[t]here is no canonical definition of textualism” and 
this Article does not purport to debate the question.  Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13, at 1216 n.7.  
In the Part of the Article devoted to considering the “plain meaning” of the text, the author has 
strived to draw conclusions from the semantic meaning of the words, their context established by 
the other words of the Constitution and any purposes conveyed exclusively by those words.  The 
author has relied on Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner’s specifications for the traditional 
boundaries of textual fidelity as articulated in their book on the topic, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).  Bradley & Siegel, 
supra note 13, at 1281–82.  That work is cited repeatedly during discussions of interpreting the text.  
In so doing, the author does not necessarily endorse its claims about the appropriate tools for 
resolving textual disputes when the text is ambiguous or subject to plausible competing 
interpretations.  The traditional tools for interpreting text include determining the purpose of a text 
from its words and making structural observations about a document that informs those words: the 
latter, in textualist nomenclature, is called “context.”  These textual approaches should not be 
confused with other modalities of constitutional construction that employ extra-textual evidence of 
the Constitution’s purpose or structure in resolving constitutional disputes. 
 17 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 9–28 (articulating textualist theory). 
 18 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 88 (2010); 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 29 (2014) (advocating robust purposivism in textual 
interpretation that includes consideration of legislative history). 
 19 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 321, 354 (1990) (advocating a pluralist approach to textual interpretation while 
conceding that “the statutory text is the most authoritative interpretive criterion”). 
 20 BREYER, supra note 18, at 88. 
 21 But see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13, at 1214 (maintaining that “[t]he constraining effect of clear 
text . . . is partially constructed by considerations that are commonly regarded as extratextual”). 
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Lastly, the Article will explore some of the implications of its conclusion: 
that the text of the Constitution requires the Senate to consider the 
President’s nominees and provide a process for each nominee that could 
reasonably result in filling the vacancy.  And, it will explain why the 
requirement of Senate consideration matters in practice—even if a 
controlling Senate faction resolves to ultimately withhold consent from a 
nominee before any consideration process has occurred. 
I.  LESSONS FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT:  WHETHER THE 
SENATE MUST CONSIDER A NOMINEE 
After Justice Scalia’s death, the partisan stakes for filling the vacancy were 
high.  The political origin of the remaining justices was evenly divided 
between the two parties.22  The appointee would therefore tip the perceived 
ideological balance on the Court.  Within the prior decade, the Court had 
recently been called upon to resolve monumental and politically incendiary 
issues.  It had interpreted the First Amendment to prohibit common tools of 
campaign-finance reform, affirmed most portions of the Affordable Care 
Act, held for the first time that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms 
established a personal right, and that same-sex couples possessed a 
constitutional right to marry.23  Three of those four cases it resolved by five-
to-four margins.24 
Within an hour of Justice Scalia’s death, the Republican Senate Majority 
Leader, Mitch McConnell, announced that the Senate would not allow 
President Barack Obama, a Democrat, to replace him.25  Senate leadership 
subsequently maintained that the Constitution imposed no requirement 
upon it to consider President Obama’s nominee.  Rather, it asserted that its 
advice and consent role implied the authority to determine whether to 
consider a nominee at all—and that it “fulfill[ed]” its role by “withholding 
 
 22 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan were appointed by Democratic Presidents.  
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts were appointed by Republican 
Presidents.  A List of the Justices of the Supreme Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Jan. 27, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/bc9cfb3386884c7382bdc49f8116347b.   
 23 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008). 
 24 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2585; King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 316; Heller, 554 
U.S. at 572. 
 25 Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement Under 
Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 6:34 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitch-
mcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248 (quoting McConnell as saying, 
“[T]his vacancy should not be filled until we have a new president”). 
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[its] support for the nomination during a presidential election year.”26  
Implicit in the Senate majority’s position were three tacit claims of power 
over the appointment process: to delay indefinitely the appointment of 
justices, to reduce unilaterally the size of the Court, and to shift the 
nomination authority to a subsequent President.  Indeed, the Senate applied 
those claims in practice.  The majority successfully delayed the appointment 
process for two Supreme Court terms.  It shifted the nomination power to a 
President of its own party, Donald Trump, and secured the appointment of 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, a perceived ideological conservative, to fill a vacancy 
that had first occurred eleven months before the expiration of President 
Obama’s term.  And, when it appeared President Trump might not win the 
fall election, important voices in the Senate Republican caucus suggested 
that they would refuse to consider any nominee a President Hillary Clinton 
might suggest—and thereby indefinitely reduce the Court’s size beyond the 
year its inaction had already assured.27 
The Senate majority embraced the notion that it had delayed the 
appointment process for ideological reasons.  It specifically argued that the 
voters should have input at the ballot box precisely because of the expected 
ideological effect of the new justice on the court.  That rationale would make 
little sense unless the criteria for judicial selection was ideological and 
partisan, rather than presumptively focused on a nominee’s qualifications.28  
 
 26 Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Grassley Statement 
on the President’s Nomination of Merrick Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statement-presidents-nomination-
merrick-garland-us-supreme-court; see also Grassley Letter, supra note 1; Press Release, Orrin Hatch, 
U.S. Senator, Hatch Statement on the Nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court (Mar. 
16, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/hatch-statement-on-the-
nomination-of-merrick-garland-to-the-supreme-court (characterizing the withholding of 
consideration as itself the “exercise” of the Senate’s “advice-and-consent power”); Press Release, 
Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, Hatch: “Democrats are Peddling False Claims about the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court Vacancy” (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm/2016/4/hatch-democrats-are-peddling-false-claims-about-the-constitution-and-the-
supreme-court-vacancy (quoting from an earlier speech that “Advice and consent begins with a 
judgment about the best way to exercise [the Senate’s] power in each situation.”). 
 27 David A. Graham, What Happens if Republicans Refuse to Replace Scalia?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/whats-the-opposite-of-court-
packing/506081/ (quoting Republican Senators Burr, Cruz, and McCain who each stated 
separately that they would block any Clinton nominee, and discussing claims by conservative 
commentators of constitutional right to leave position vacant). 
 28 Amita Kelly, McConnell: Blocking Supreme Court Nomination ‘About a Principle, Not a Person’, NPR (Mar. 
16, 2016, 12:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/16/470664561/mcconnell-blocking-
supreme-court-nomination-about-a-principle-not-a-person (reporting responses of various 
Senators to the nomination of Merrick Garland expressing Republican consensus that no nominee 
should be considered until after the election.  Senator McConnell: “Let’s let the American People 
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By that standard, the delay resulted in a remarkable partisan triumph for the 
Republican Party.  With the election of President Trump, the pending 
vacancy, and the age of several sitting justices, the Republican Party was 
positioned to secure ideological control of the Court for another generation.29 
But how does one evaluate that political victory through non-partisan 
lenses?  Did it represent a legitimate assertion of political authority earned at 
the ballot box and contemplated by the Constitution?  Or did the Senate’s 
unprecedented claim of authority over the appointment process defeat the 
Constitution’s intended design for the distribution of power between the 
branches?  If so, was it ultimately a defeat for the rule of law and the civil 
society it fosters? 
The only constitutional language that squarely addresses the 
appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is found in Article II, Section 2, and 
includes both the Appointments Clause and that clause’s component, the 
Recess Appointments Clause.  Those clauses read as follows: 
The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court . . . .  
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire 
at the End of their next Session.30 
As shall be explained, that language cannot be harmonized with the Senate’s 
claim that it may lawfully refuse to consider a President’s nominee. 
A.  Vacancies to Be Filled Mandatorily and Promptly 
The Appointments Clause contains three operative parts: (1) the 
President “shall nominate,” (2) he then “shall appoint,” and (3) the latter 
action must occur “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”  In 
context then, the Senate’s advice and consent role is the second step of a 
three-part process: nomination, Senate consideration, and appointment.31  
All three steps are necessary for a vacancy to be filled. 
 
 
decide.”  Senator Grassley: supporting refusal to consider any candidate until after the election 
because “[a] lifetime appointment . . . could dramatically impact individual freedoms and change 
the direction of the court for at least a generation.”  Senator Cornyn: “The next justice could change 
the ideological makeup of the Court for a generation . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 29 Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: What Will the Presidential Election Mean for SCOTUS?, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 6, 
2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
chemerinsky_what_will_the_coming_election_mean_for_scotus/. 
 30  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 31 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 167 (“Context is a primary determinant of meaning. . . .  
The entirety of [the pertinent text] thus provides the context for each of its parts.”). 
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Crucially, the clause sets forth the beginning and ending steps of that 
process in mandatory terms: the President “shall” nominate and the 
President “shall” appoint.  The text thus describes the Senate’s consideration 
of a President’s nominee as a necessary step occurring within a mandatory 
process.  This directive, that the appointment process is mandatory, textually 
demonstrates the purpose of the clause: completed appointments.  Put 
another way, the text of the clause, when read in its entirety, implies that 
Senate consideration is necessary for the clause to fulfill its purpose: the 
staffing of specified, important governmental positions. 
In short, the clause’s mandatory language, read in the context of its 
evident purpose, describes a process for filling vacancies that is logically 
obligatory on both the President and the Senate.  Indeed, the Constitution 
uses the words “with” and “by” to preface the Senate’s role of consideration: 
these are words of connection and derivation respectively.  They 
linguistically wed the Senate’s role to the President’s expressly obligatory one. 
The language immediately subsequent in the text, the Recess 
Appointments Clause, corroborates this construction.  That clause 
authorizes the President to bypass Senate consideration altogether when the 
Senate lacks the institutional ability to provide it.  Under that clause, when 
the two competing directives of prompt appointment and Senate 
consideration collide, the Constitution gives primacy to prompt 
appointment: an unambiguous textual elevation of governmental 
functionality over “checks and balances.”  The Supreme Court has itself 
adopted this function-based reading of the Recess Appointments Clause.  In 
Noel Canning, the majority observed that the purpose of that clause is to allow 
the President to “ensure the continued functioning of the Federal 
Government.”32 
To be sure, nothing in the Recess Appointments Clause itself commands 
urgent consideration when a candidate is nominated during a Senate session. 
And, the Senate is presumably empowered to balance the importance of 
filling vacancies against the quality of the President’s individual nominees in 
light of the time remaining before recess.  But the Recess Appointments 
Clause does place a limit on the Senate’s power to impair the President’s 
mandate to staff the government—and it textually undermines any claim that 
the Senate is tacitly empowered to delay that process by postponing 




 32 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014). 
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Thus, the Senate’s specific claim here—that it possessed the 
constitutional authority to indefinitely disable the appointment process by 
declining to consider a President’s nominee—cannot be harmonized with 
either the mandatory language within the Appointments Clause (which 
obliges the Senate to perform its advice and consent role) or the purpose 
conveyed by both pertinent clauses read together (that those important 
government positions itemized in Article II, Section 2 be promptly filled).  If, 
as the text of Article II semantically provides, the appointment process is a 
mandatory one that should not be delayed even by Senate recess, it would 
be illogical to construe that text as granting the Senate power to unilaterally 
postpone that process indefinitely. 
Indeed, if the Senate need not consider an individual nominee or, as 
claimed by the 114th Senate, consider any nominee of a particular President, 
then the Senate will have secured functional control over both the timing of 
appointments and whether certain vacancies are ever filled.  But, as 
discussed, the appointments clauses set forth in Article II, Section 2 endorse 
functionality.  Neither clause suggests that the Senate should be empowered 
to control the timing of when vacancies would be filled.  To the extent 
Article II gives either branch control over timing, it gives it to the President.  
The text expressly provides the President with the exclusive power of 
nomination and therefore the authority to initiate the process.   
Nonetheless, several constitutional scholars have maintained that 
congressional power to determine the size of the Supreme Court implies 
Senate authority to decline consideration of the President’s nominee.33  If the 
Senate is empowered to reduce the size of the Court through legislation, they 
reason, it surely crosses no constitutional boundary when it achieves the same 
result through legislative inaction.  
 
 
 33 See Noah Feldman, Obama and Republicans Are Both Wrong About Constitution, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 
2016, 12:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-17/obama-and-senate-are-
both-wrong-about-the-constitution (arguing that the refusal to consider nominee and leave a position 
vacant is not a constitutional violation because Congress has control of the size of the Court); see also 
Johnathan Adler, The Erroneous Argument the Senate Has a ‘Constitutional Duty’ to Consider a Supreme Court 
Nominee, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/15/the-erroneous-
argument-the-senate-has-a-constitutional-duty-to-consider-a-supreme-court-nominee/ (quoting 
Noah Feldman to argue that the refusal to consider a nominee and leave a position vacant does not 
violate the Constitution); Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn’t Have to Act on Merrick Garland’s 
Nomination, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/ 
senate-obama-merric-garland-supreme-court-nominee/482733/ (making the same argument in the 
context of explaining why the Senate has no affirmative duty to act on a Supreme Court nominee). 
 
Oct. 2018] THE GARLAND NOMINATION 45 
   
 
This argument overlooks that the Senate is not unilaterally empowered to 
reduce the size of the Court.  Congress must do so through the legislative 
process, “by Law,” as Article II, Section 2 requires.  Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution provides that: “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a Law, be presented 
to the President of the United States . . . .”34  Thus, a constitutionally 
permissive reduction of the Court would require the assent of two political 
bodies other than the Senate including, importantly here, the President. 
The Constitution’s design for determining the size of the Court 
underscores why its text cannot be interpreted as empowering the Senate to 
refuse to consider a specific President’s nominees.  If the Advice and Consent 
Clause could be construed to grant the Senate the power to leave a vacancy 
unfilled indefinitely, it would empower the Senate to achieve unilaterally 
results that the Constitution specifies must occur jointly through the 
legislative process.  And, no language in the Constitution suggests the Senate 
may so bypass the legislative process to change the size of the Court.  Rather, 
the Constitution describes a legislative process calibrated to include the 
checks and balances inherent in the participation of the House and the 
President.  Thus, the Advice and Consent Clause cannot be read to provide 
the Senate a power that would so undermine the legislative process expressly 
prescribed for determining court size.35 
Vikram Amar and several other constitutional commentators have 
contended that Article II articulates no textual duty on the Senate to act on a 
Presidential nomination.36  Specifically, Amar asserts that “[t]he text of the 
Constitution certainly does not use any language suggesting the Senate has a 
legal obligation to do anything.”37  In so concluding, he correctly observes 
that the Appointments Clause does not attach the word “shall” to the Senate’s 
advice and consent role.38  But Amar overlooks that using “shall” to describe 
the Senate’s role would have been linguistically confusing because one part of 
that role, the provision of consent, is semantically not obligatory on the 
Senate.  And, as discussed, the language plainly describes the Senate’s role as 
 
 34 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7. 
 35 Feldman, supra note 33.  In his commentary, Professor Feldman suggests that this constraint on 
Senate authority over the size of the Court would be “highly formalistic.”  Id.  But, it is a species of 
formalism that the Constitution expressly requires. 
 36 Vikram David Amar, The Grave Risks of the Senate Republicans’ Stated Refusal to Process Any Supreme Court 
Nominee President Obama Sends Them, VERDICT (Feb. 26, 2016) 
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/02/26; Feldman, supra note 33; Ramsey, supra note 33. 
 37 Amar, supra note 36. 
 38 Id. 
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an indispensable second step to an unambiguously mandatory process.  
Nor can it be correctly argued that, in the context of Article II, “shall” 
denotes a discretionary act.39  Article II, Section 1, devoted to the procedures 
by which a President takes and leaves office, uses the word “shall” 25 times.  
In each case, it denotes an obligatory procedural step or event.  For example, 
that section uses the word “shall” to describe the indispensable duty of the 
President to take the oath of office: “Before he enter on the Execution of his 
Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation . . . .”40   
In yet tighter context, Article II, Section 2 prefaces the President’s 
itemized powers in three different ways.  That section does not state that the 
President “shall” make treaties.  It does not state that the President “shall” 
appoint during a recess nor does it state the President “shall” grant reprieves 
and pardons.  Rather, it states that he “shall have Power” to do these things.  
Elsewhere, that section uses the word “may” to describe (1) the President’s 
entitlement to receive opinions from his executive departments and (2) the 
Senate’s authority to delegate appointment authority to inferior officers or 
department heads.41   
Thus, the Constitution calibrates the level of presidential duty attached 
to each of the individual powers set forth in Article II, Section 2.  In so doing, 
it specifies whether the exercise of each power is discretionary or obligatory.42  
By twice using the word “shall” in the Appointments Clause, the 
constitutional text articulates that the President’s twin duties of nomination 
and appointment are obligatory, not discretionary.  Such a textual choice 
demonstrates the Constitution commands important vacancies be filled.  It 
thereby implicitly suggests that doing so is necessary for the functioning of 
government itself.  In this context, the Senate’s advice and consent role is 
semantically triggered by the President’s obligatory act of nominating a judge 
and is necessary for the subsequent obligatory act of appointing the nominee.  
 
 39 In A Fragment on Shall and May, Nora Rotter Tillman and Seth Barrett Tillman contend that the 
terms “will” and “shall” may have had different uses at the time of the Constitution’s drafting than 
those accepted today.  50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 453, 455–56 (2010) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 8).  Specifically, they suggest that in 1787 “shall” was sometimes used to indicate futurity and 
“will” to instead indicate emphatic tense.  Id. at 455.  But the example they provide, the Oath 
Clause in Article II, Section 1, plainly uses “shall” to denote obligation and “will” to indicate 
futurity: “Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or 
Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President 
of the United States . . . .’”  Id. at 456 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added)). 
 40 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 41 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 42 Feldman, supra note 33.  This context for the use of “shall” in Article II, Section 2 contradicts 
Professor Feldman’s suggestion that the “shall” in the Appointments Clause nonetheless “confers 
some discretion on the executive.”  Id. 
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As such, the Senate’s role can only be understood as a procedural obligation.  
No other reading is functionally plausible or consistent with the intent 
conveyed by the words of the Appointments Clause. 
B.  Refusal of Consideration Distinguished from Refusal of Consent  
To be sure, the Senate possesses an express textual power to refuse 
consent.  That power, if deployed methodically after consideration, could 
equally obstruct the appointment of important government officers.  Could 
it not be argued, then, that the Framers understood they were empowering 
the Senate to so obstruct the filling of vacancies? 
Not in the same way.  The Senate’s refusal of consent, in contrast to 
withholding consideration, does not itself halt the mandatory process 
established to fill important vacancies.  This is because the President retains 
the power to nominate sequentially other candidates who are, in turn, 
entitled to Senate consideration.43  Serial nomination—when consideration 
is assumed—provides a check on the Senate’s power by deterring it from 
unreasonably withholding consent to a President’s first nominee.  After all, 
they might find the second nominee less appealing than the first.  For 
example, had the 114th Senate commenced consideration of Judge Garland, 
it may have ultimately been encouraged to grant consent given that no other 
nominee would likely be either so advanced in age or ideologically moderate 
in profile.44  By contrast, the Senate’s refusal to consider any nominee of a 
given President utterly disables the process: a process that the two controlling 
clauses articulate as both mandatory and urgent. 
Furthermore, the Senate’s potential refusal of consent, unlike the refusal 
of consideration, is expressly contemplated as part of the mandatory process 
set forth in the Appointments Clause.  Indeed, withholding consent completes 
the first two of the steps envisioned by the clause: the President’s exercise of 
the nomination power has occurred and the Senate has considered the 
nominee.  The Senate’s power to withhold consent is implicit in the words of 
the Constitution: the Senate’s authority to withhold consideration is 
contradicted by the semantic meaning of the same words.  To those 
 
 43 As shall be discussed below, that is precisely how the Framers envisioned that the process would 
function in practice.  See infra notes 45–46.  But, this Part confines itself to arguments based 
exclusively on text. 
 44 See Eliza Collins, Flake is Ready to Move Forward with Garland’s Nomination, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2016, 
9:31 AM), https://usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/10/21/report-flake-
ready-move-forward-garlands-nomination/92506676/ (reporting that Republican Senator Flake 
suggested that the Senate “move forward” with hearings for fear that Hillary Clinton would appoint 
a less-moderate justice). 
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committed to abiding by procedural law as expressed by constitutional text, 
that difference is crucial. 
C.  The President’s Exclusive Power to Nominate Is Illusory Absent Senate 
Consideration 
The Appointments Clause also provides guidance when considered in its 
individual parts.  As Justice Scalia explained in his treatise on statutory 
interpretation, courts should construe legal texts to render every part 
operative.45  In effect, this rule “holds that it is no more the court’s function 
to revise by subtraction than by addition.”46  To avoid this risk, no part of a 
legal text should be “given an interpretation that causes it . . . to have no 
consequence.”47  In conformity with this bedrock principle of both textual 
interpretation and logical communication, the Appointments Clause should 
not be construed so as to render any part of its language ineffectual. 
That clause provides that the President “shall nominate.”  Semantically, 
that power is exclusive to the President.  Further, its context identifies it as a 
non-trivial executive prerogative.  The Appointments Clause is found in 
Article II, Section 2, the paragraph of the Constitution devoted to itemizing 
the powers of the President.  No parallel nomination or appointment 
authority is found in Article I, Section 8, which sets forth the powers of the 
Senate.  Nor was it placed in the more neutral territory of Article III.  And, 
Article II begins by stating that the President is endowed with “the executive 
power.”  This structure and placement together suggest that the Constitution 




 45 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 174–75. 
 46 Id. at 174. 
 47 Id.  This canon of interpretation was well understood in the founding era.  In later considering 
whether the Appointments Clause provided the President or the Senate with the power of removing 
non-judicial officers, George Mason, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, observed to 
James Monroe that “it is a well known Rule of Construction, that no Clause or Expression shall be 
deemed superfluous or nugatory, which is capable of a fair and rational Meaning.”  Letter from 
George Mason to James Monroe (Jan. 30, 1792), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725–
1972: 1787–1792, at 1254, 1255 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970). 
 48 The Author recognizes that this can be characterized as a species of structural argument rather 
than as a textual argument.  However, all textual interpretation theories elevate the importance of 
context in interpreting text.  Thus, the more broadly one defines context, the more an argument 
can be construed as one of structure.  However, the argument here confines itself to the context 
provided by the other words of the Constitution itself—not more general and debatable arguments 
about the Founders’ goals in generating a new Constitution. 
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Understood properly, then, Article II expressly endows the President with 
the broad power over executive functions.  Indeed, most of the governmental 
posts identified in the appointments clauses are employed in executive 
departments: departments which the President is given express power to 
direct.  This structure implicitly identifies the selection of such officials as, 
fundamentally, an executive function.49  The unqualified nature of the 
President’s nomination power thus conforms to the context of Article II.  
Furthermore, the President’s authority to nominate finds its place alongside 
the clauses providing the President power to act as Commander in Chief, to 
direct the executive departments, to “grant reprieves and Pardons,” and to 
make treaties.50  Each represents a substantial grant of authority to the 
executive branch.  
The President’s exclusive power to nominate, read together with the 
exclusive, but qualified, power to appoint, signals a broader textual design to 
primarily empower the President to select Supreme Court justices.  
Conversely, the Senate’s power to withhold consent, but not nominate or 
appoint, sounds in veto, not selection.  Understood in its context, placed 
among important executive powers, the Senate’s advice and consent role 
must be construed as creating a check on an appointment power otherwise 
defined as executive in nature. 
Yet, the President’s power to name a candidate would be a comparatively 
trivial one, hardly worthy of such prominent textual emphasis, if it did not 
include the power to have the candidate considered.  Nomination without 
consideration is a futile act.  Conversely, a Senate that claims the authority 
to withhold consideration of a nominee has captured concurrent authority to 
decide who will be considered.  A Senate empowered to decline consideration 
of a nominee would functionally share the power of nomination itself. 
Thus, one cannot construe the Senate’s advice and consent authority to 
imply the additional power to withhold consideration without compromising 
the President’s unique textual authority to nominate.  Such a construction 
would render the Nominations Clause, which reads as an exclusive executive 
power, mystifyingly inarticulate.  Put another way, the claim that the Senate’s 
consent authority tacitly includes the power to refuse consideration altogether 
cannot be harmonized with the express constitutional language endowing the 
President with the exclusive power to nominate. 
 
 49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .”). 
 50 Id. 
 
50 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:1 
   
 
D.  No Text Articulates or Implies Any Senate Authority to Refuse Consideration 
Just as neutral principles of textual interpretation require giving each 
operative word effect, they also forbid adding language that the authors did 
not include.51  If the Constitution had been framed to convey that the Senate 
would be granted concurrent control over who would receive consideration, 
very different words would have been used to describe such a process. 
The words “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, [the 
President] shall appoint” would be wholly inadequate to convey any Senate 
authority to refuse to consider a nominee.  Those words semantically modify 
the President’s appointment power, not his nomination power.  For this 
reason, the Senate’s power to provide advice and refuse consent does not 
textually include any power to determine whom the President can nominate.  
Nor does that phrase endow the Senate with authority over which President 
may nominate a judge or the political circumstances under which a President 
may do so.  Textually, the phrase describes only the authority to grant or 
withhold consent to the appointment of an already nominated candidate.  It does 
not articulate unilateral Senate authority to determine the size of the court 
or to control the timing of the appointment process.  It certainly does not 
describe any power to add a substantial fourth step to the three-step process 
of nomination, consideration, and appointment—such as the consideration 
of the nominee by the public in an intervening presidential election. 
To be sure, a founding era political theorist might argue that the 
legislative branch should retain all of these powers and, as will be seen, 
several delegates to the Constitutional Convention made arguments that the 
legislature should dominate the appointment process.  But the words chosen 
at that Convention do not themselves imply, much less articulate, any such 
Senate authority.  As explained above, the placement of the Appointments 
Clause in Article II, Section 2 among the list of the President’s specified 
powers instead of in Article I—or more neutrally in Article III—contradicts 
any notion that the Senate enjoys an unarticulated power to dominate the 
appointment process arising from its advice and consent role. 
Far from providing textual support for inaction, the Advice and Consent 
Clause defines the lone Senate role in the appointment process as the essence 
of consideration.  By definition and logic, both advice and consent are 
themselves acts of consideration.  The Senate cannot provide advice regarding 
a candidate for appointment without participating in the consideration of that 
candidate.  Similarly, the Senate cannot withhold or provide consent without 
considering a nominee.  Thus, the 114th Senate claimed a power to withhold 
 
 51 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 93. 
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consideration from words that describe only the provision of it.  It claimed a 
power of inaction from text that describes only action. 
E.  Neither Constitutional Silence Nor Senate Rule-Making Power Authorizes Inaction  
At the outset of the debate between President Obama and the Senate 
regarding the process for filling the vacancy, Professor Ilya Somin presented 
the thrust of the Senate’s textual claim in a commentary published by The 
Washington Post.52  Specifically, he observed that the Appointments Clause is 
silent on the “specific procedure by which the Senate can refuse its 
consent.”53  Somin further observed that Article I, Section 5 affirmatively 
endows the Senate with the power to “determine the rules of its proceedings,” 
a power that, in his view, necessarily included the power to refuse 
consideration altogether.54  From this, he concluded that Article II, Section 2 
“does not indicate whether it must do so by taking a vote, or whether it can 
simply refuse to consider the President’s nominee at all.”55  Senator Orrin 
Hatch echoed this theory when he maintained in defense of his caucus that 
“the Constitution [does not] require the Senate to hold a hearing on a 
nominee, or even to take any action at all.”56  
In essence, Somin’s textual construction is based in equal part on express 
Senate rule-making authority and on an inference from constitutional 
silence.  But the text of Article II renders both arguments unpersuasive. 
The Senate’s rule-making authority, the power to design its own 
deliberative procedure, does not operate independently of other 
constitutional mandates.  Like all other constitutional provisions, its scope 
must be understood in harmony with the document as a whole.57  Article I, 
 
 52 Ilya Somin, The Constitution Does Not Require the Senate to Give Judicial Nominees an Up or Down Vote, 
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/17/the-constitution-does-not-require-the-senate-to-give-
judicial-nominees-an-up-or-down-vote/. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2).  Michael Ramsey also urged a species of this argument 
in his debate with Erwin Chemerinsky at the National Constitution Center.  See We the People: Does 
the Senate Have a Duty to Hold Hearings for Supreme Court Nominees?, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR. (Apr. 
7, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/podcast-does-the-senate-have-a-duty-to-hold-
hearings-for-supreme-court-nomi (arguing that the language in Article I, Section 5 of the United 
States Constitution gives the Senate the power to “determine the rules of its proceedings,” and 
allows the Senate to deny consent to a Supreme Court nominee by refusing to hold a hearing). 
 55 Somin, supra note 52. 
 56 Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, Senate Should Not Hold Hearings for Obama SCOTUS 
Nominee (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/sen-orrin-
hatch-senate-should-not-hold-hearings-for-obama-scotus-nominee. 
 57 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 167–69 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
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Section 5 does not authorize the Senate, by setting its own parliamentary 
rules, to take otherwise unconstitutional acts or contradict plain 
constitutional directive. 
The Supreme Court itself has emphasized this limitation on Senate rule-
making authority in the context of appointments.  In Noel Canning, the Court 
acknowledged the power of the Senate to determine the length of its own 
sessions, but also observed: 
The Constitution explicitly empowers the Senate to “determine the Rules of 
its Proceedings.”  And we have held that “all matters of method are open to 
the determination” of the Senate, as long as there is “a reasonable relation 
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the 
result which is sought to be attained” and the rule does not “ignore 
constitutional restraints . . . .”58 
Somin overlooks both of these limitations on Senate rule-making authority. 
Senate procedure must bear a reasonable relation to the result that the 
procedure facilitates.  Here, the “result . . . sought to be attained” must be 
the Senate’s performance of its textual mandate to provide timely advice and 
consent on a President’s nominee and to facilitate the Constitution’s purpose 
of staffing important government posts.59  The Senate cannot claim that it 
reasonably pursues those constitutional purposes when it utterly refuses to 
activate any process, much less those set forth in its own rules, for evaluating 
nominees. 
Nor can Senate rule-making authority “ignore constitutional restraints.”  
For example,  the phrase immediately preceding the Appointments Clause 
in Article II, Section 2 provides that the President has the power to make 
treaties “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds 
of the Senators  . . . concur.”60  The Senate could not determine instead, 
based on its rule-making power, that it would hereafter take three-quarters 
of the Senators to concur.  The Senate’s general authority over its own 
internal procedures is thus subordinate to other, more specific, constitutional 
text that circumscribes the Senate’s rule-making authority in the context of 
ratifying treaties.61  Nor could the Senate claim constitutional sanction under 
its rule-making authority to thwart the President’s power to “convene” the 
Senate—even though parliamentary rules for gathering Senate members are 
 
316, 406 (1819)). 
 58 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014) (internal citations omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)). 
 59 Id. 
 60 U.S. CONST. ART II, § 2. 
 61 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 180–88 (explaining that when two provisions of the same 
statutory scheme facially conflict, they are to be read in harmony and the more-specific provision 
controls over the general). 
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generally governed by the Senate’s rules.  In short, Senate rule-making 
authority is necessarily subordinate to, and must be exercised in accordance 
with, express constitutional directive.  Thus, to the extent a persuasive case 
has been made that the constitutional text demonstrates a requirement that 
(1) consideration of nominees occur; (2) in a reasonably prompt fashion; and 
(3) with a purpose of filling vacancies to facilitate governmental function, the 
mere existence of Senate rule-making authority provides no entitlement to 
disregard that mandate. 
Somin’s second suggestion—that Article II is silent on the question of 
Senate consideration—simply mischaracterizes that text.  As explained 
above, Article II semantically imposes on the Senate a duty to perform its 
advice and consent role.  To review, that text gives the President the exclusive 
power to nominate: an illusory power if it does not trigger Senate 
consideration of the nominee.  And, the text sets forth a mandatory process, 
which must necessarily include Senate consideration, to promptly fill 
important governmental posts. 
Furthermore, as discussed, a fundamental canon of textual 
interpretation, endorsed by Justice Scalia, forbids adding language that the 
authors did not provide.  If the Appointments Clause had been crafted to 
empower the Senate to disregard a President’s nominees in contradiction of 
apparent goals reflected in its language, it would not have conveyed such a 
counterweight with textual silence.  As discussed, had the Constitution been 
crafted to convey that the President and Senate essentially shared the power 
of nomination, the Appointments Clause would not have been placed 
exclusively in Article II, among the list of Presidential powers and the phrase 
“he shall nominate” would have been qualified. 
Contrary to Somin’s suggestion, then, the relevant text is far from 
indifferent as to whether the Senate must consider a President’s nominees.  
Rather, the Constitution’s silence is dispositive only in providing no support 
for the Senate’s novel claim of dominant authority over the appointment 
process.  And, although Article I, Section 5 authorizes the Senate to employ 
its own parliamentary process once the President has selected a nominee, the  
text of Article II requires that the process be designed to fulfill the Senate’s 
constitutional role in appointment.  Withholding consideration altogether, 
the functional equivalent of withholding discharge of its obligatory 
constitutional role, contradicts that directive. 
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II.  WHAT CONSIDERATION MUST ENTAIL 
A.  Conclusions from the Text Alone 
Based on the text and context in Article II, then, “advice and consent” is 
an obligatory process that requires the Senate to consider a President’s 
individual nominees.  But what must that consideration involve?  Although 
the Constitution specifies no particular process beyond an expectation that 
advice and consent occur, its text does provide guidance on what 
consideration must entail. 
Article I, Section 5 endows the Senate with the authority to “determine 
the Rules of its Proceedings.”62  As explained above, the Senate’s 
constitutional entitlement to adopt its own rules of procedure does not relieve 
the Senate of complying with its duty to provide advice and consent.  
Importantly here, however, those limits on rule-making authority also 
impose some general, but meaningful, constraints on the procedural features 
of consideration itself. 
To review, the Senate’s rules are textually subordinate to the more 
specific directives of the Constitution.63  Indeed, in Noel Canning, our Supreme 
Court required “a reasonable relation between the mode or method of 
proceeding established by the rule and the [constitutional] result which is 
sought to be attained.”64  Therefore, any specific procedures promulgated by 
the Senate for the conduct of “advice and consent” must enable it to perform 
the constitutional duties set forth in the Appointments Clause.  As discussed 
above, the repeated obligatory language within that clause, considered 
together with its recess-appointment provision, demonstrates a textual 
requirement that important government vacancies be filled in a reasonably 
prompt fashion.  At minimum, then, any Senate procedure for providing 
advice and consent must be designed to timely facilitate the potential 
confirmation of a nominee.  Put another way, the Senate has an affirmative 
constitutional duty to provide a process by which a nominee will receive consideration, and 
through which an appointment can plausibly occur.  Because any appointment could 
only occur through the consent of the Senate, that process must include some 
avenue by which the Senate, as a body, could eventually express its consent 




 62 U.S. CONST. art. I, §5. 
 63 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014). 
 64 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)). 
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The text of the Appointments Clause also sets forth some implicit 
constraints on that process.  As previously observed, the text describing the 
Senate’s powers in the appointment process, the Advice and Consent Clause, 
limits only the President’s power of appointment—not the power of 
nomination.  Specifically, the Senate’s role is textually and semantically 
confined to providing advice and consent as to an already-nominated 
candidate.  Nothing in the text of Article II, Section 2 provides either the 
President or the Senate the discretion to determine, as a threshold matter, 
whether nomination or consideration will occur based on their views of 
optimal political timing or ideological advantage.  Rather it specifies that the 
President “shall nominate” and, thereafter, that the President “shall appoint” 
in a timely manner. 
For these reasons, the Appointments Clause does not provide the Senate 
with the threshold authority to determine whether, and under what political 
circumstances, it will consider a President’s nominee.  When the leadership 
of the 114th Senate maintained that it would consider no nominees of 
President Obama until after the voters had spoken in the 2016 presidential 
election, it may have been presenting a politically palatable and ultimately 
successful rationale.  But it was not articulating a constitutionally correct 
basis for refusing to consider a lawfully nominated candidate for the United 
States Supreme Court.  Instead, it was asserting a power over the 
appointment process that the Constitution plainly did not provide it. 
B.  Extra-Textual Sources of Constitutional Guidance 
The text provides only general guidance and leaves important procedural 
questions unanswered.  For example, does the mandate—that the Senate 
provide some procedure that facilitates the timely confirmation of an 
individual nominee—require a vote from the full Senate on every nominee?  
Arguably, a constitutionally compliant procedure need only potentially result 
in such a vote.  Nor does the text itself confine individual Senators to any 
particular criteria once they actually consider a particular nominee.  If the 
constitutional text provides only general standards for what consideration 
must entail, does the Senate necessarily possess unlimited discretion to shape 
procedure within those broad confines?  Or, are there additional 
constitutional constraints on the Senate process arising from other 
approaches to interpreting the Appointments Clause? 
In Noel Canning, the Court held that, when express constitutional text 
provides ambiguous direction, or no direction, “‘[l]ong settled and 
established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper 
interpretation of constitutional provisions’ regulating the relationship 
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between Congress and the President.”65  In fact, it resolved several 
procedural disputes arising from the Recess Appointments Clause largely on 
that basis.66  It further suggested that a practice “of at least twenty years 
duration” might be considered “[l]ong settled and established.”67 
In addressing whether the Senate could constitutionally withhold 
consideration of Judge Garland on grounds that the vacancy arose in the last 
year of a President’s term, Robin Kar and Jason Mazzone have conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of historical practice to answer that distinct 
question.68  Although this Article contends that such an approach was not 
necessary given the express guidance provided in the Constitution, historical 
practice could be marshalled to address procedural questions for which the 
Constitution truly provides no direction.  Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel have 
explored some of the analytical challenges in divining the appropriate 
application of the “historical practice” interpretive gloss.69  A nuanced review 
of the Senate’s historical practice in considering presidential nominees, 
which comprehensively addresses those analytical challenges, is beyond the 
scope of this thesis (which focuses on the lessons of constitutional text).  But, 
in light of the Court’s reasoning in Noel Canning, such a review could 
conceivably provide the Senate additional, more specific, direction on what 
a constitutionally compliant advice and consent process must include.  
Because such an inquiry becomes relevant only in answering procedural 
questions left unresolved by the text of the Constitution, any insights from 
the Senate’s historical practice in discharging its advice and consent role 
could not undermine the minimum requirements for that practice arising 
from the words of Article II, Section 2, as identified above. 
Theoretically, founding-era understandings of Article II, Section 2 can 
also provide an extra-textual source of constitutional guidance.  Although the 
interpretive value of such evidence is a matter of fierce academic dispute,70  
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Noel Canning marshalled such 
understandings of the Recess Appointments Clause in resolving disputed 
appointment power.71  Furthermore, the leadership of the Senate majority, 
 
 65 Id. at 2559 (alteration in original) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)). 
 66 Id. at 2568–69 (using lessons of historical practice to resolve meaning of “vacancies that may 
happen”); id. at 2562–67 (following the same practice to determine the definition of “recess”); id. at 
2566–67 (following the same practice to determine the length of actionable recess). 
 67 Id. at 2559 (second alteration in original) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 689, 690). 
 68 Kar & Mazzone, supra note 9, at 104. 
 69 See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13 (analyzing, comprehensively, competing interpretive 
theories regarding the use of historical gloss to resolve constitutional disputes between the branches). 
 70 See generally WILKINSON, supra note 15. 
 71 See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
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which declined to consider President Obama’s nominees, have persistently 
lauded “originalist” understandings of constitutional text and have eulogized 
Justice Scalia as a proponent of that modality of interpretation.72  
For those reasons, and because the drafters, explicators, opponents, and 
ratifiers of the Constitution did describe, sometimes at length, their 
understandings of how judicial selection would function under the words of 
the Appointments Clause, this inquiry would be incomplete without 
considering that record.  To be clear, however, the plain-text analysis 
presented in Part II above has been conducted independently of any 
evidence of the Framers’ intent or contemporary understandings of that text 
in the founding era.  Founding-era understandings are thus offered as 
confirmatory of, rather than necessary to, that analysis. 
Nonetheless, the following review of that evidence does suggest that the 
Framers intended the words to be understood as they have been semantically 
constructed above.  That evidence also suggests some additional 
constitutional constraints on the Senate’s exercise of their advice and consent 
role.  Specifically, the Framers of Article II, Section 2, both those advocating 
and opposing its ultimate ratification, universally thought that the selection 
process for the Supreme Court should focus on the nominee’s qualifications 
for the post.  And, prominent advocates for ratification—and founding-era 
constitutional scholars—identified the President’s implicit power of serial 
nomination as a check on Senate arbitrariness in the conduct of its advice 
and consent role.  At minimum, those features of our nation’s intellectual 
history should receive careful review by any Senator claiming fidelity to the 





 72 See, e.g., Prepared Floor Statement, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, Justice Antonin Scalia and His 
Role in Protecting Individual Liberties (Feb. 22, 2016) (“He focused legal argument on text and 
original understand[ing] rather than a judge’s own views of changing times. . . . Justice Scalia’s role 
as a textualist and an originalist was vital to his voting so frequently in favor of constitutional 
liberties.”); Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, Hatch Statement on the Passing of Justice 
Antonin Scalia (Feb. 16, 2016) (“As a scholar and a jurist, he led a much-needed revolution in the 
law, based on the enduring principle that the role of a judge is to say what the law is, not what the 
law should be.”); Press Release, Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator & Majority Leader, Justice 
Antonin Scalia (Feb. 13, 2016) (“[T]his giant of American jurisprudence almost singlehandedly 
revived an approach to constitutional interpretation that prioritized the text and original meaning 
of the Constitution.”). 
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III.  FOUNDING-ERA UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE APPOINTMENTS 
CLAUSE73 
As explained, the words of the Constitution articulate a design for the 
appointment process at odds with the 114th Senate’s broad claim of 
authority over that process.  The preceding analysis includes conclusions 
about constitutional purposes evident from its unadorned text: the 
Nominations Clause identifies the Presidency as the superior institution to 
select a candidate for the Supreme Court.  And, the mandatory language of 
the Appointments Clause seeks to ensure that important governmental posts 
be filled.  The text also insists that the posts be filled promptly, a point 
established by the Recess Appointments Clause.  Those purposes each 
implicitly pursue government functionality or, in the parlance of the 
founding era, governmental “vigour.”74 
Although the Court’s interpretive framework in Noel Canning gave 
primacy to the guidance provided by the unvarnished constitutional text, 
including the purposes manifest by its words, it also sought to further clarify 
constitutional purposes, when necessary, by considering the Founders’ 
contemporaneous understandings of that text.  For example, before further 
analyzing the Recess Appointments Clause, the Court articulated the broad 
purposes of that clause with reference to Alexander Hamilton’s explication 
of those goals in Federalist No. 76.75  It also relied on “the Founders’” use of 
the word “recess” during the Constitutional Convention and Hamilton’s 
assumptions about the expected length of a Senate session to resolve whether 




 73 As noted above, the author recognizes the hazards of relying exclusively on original understandings 
of constitutional text to resolve a constitutional question.  This Article nonetheless conducts such a 
review to conform to the interpretive approach conducted by the Court in Noel Canning and to 
confirm that the foregoing textual discussion—which does not depend upon any original 
understandings of the text—in fact conforms to those understandings.  See KATZMANN, supra note 
18, at 19 (finding utility in legislative history to confirm or reinforce a court’s understanding of text).  
Finally, one may recognize the limitations of complete dependence on an originalist modality for 
constitutional interpretation without claiming that founding-era understandings of the text are 
useless.  For example, original understandings of constitutional design might carry special 
interpretive weight when those understandings were shared unanimously in the era. 
 74 In Noel Canning, the majority construed the Constitution generally, and the Recess Appointments 
Clause, specifically, as provisions designed to foster the “vigour of government.”  NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 75 Id. at 2558–59. 
 76 Id. at 2561–62, 2566. 
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The Court presumably referred to such sources, the record of the 
Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers, because those sources 
provide insight into founding-era understandings of constitutional meaning.  
The former provides the best historical evidence of the Framers’ intent 
contemporaneous to drafting the Constitution.  The latter represents the most 
prominent public effort, by Framers and Federalists, to explicate the virtues 
of that document and thereby endorse it for ratification by the States.77 
At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates debated which 
institution, the “executive” or the legislature, should be empowered to 
appoint judges.  In that debate, they focused on which of those branches 
could be most trusted to elevate a candidate’s qualifications over partisan, 
geographic, or personal interests.  When the Convention first addressed the 
topic on June 5, 1787, James Madison recorded the opening statement by 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania:  
Mr. Wilson opposed the appointmt [sic] (of Judges by the) national Legisl: 
Experience shewed [sic] the impropriety of such appointmts.  by numerous 
bodies.  Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary 
consequences.  A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers 
might be appointed by a single, responsible person.78 
Madison agreed, and recorded his own thoughts, presented on the 
Convention Floor, as follows: “Mr. Madison disliked the election of the 
Judges by the Legislature or any numerous body.  Besides, the danger of 
intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite 
qualifications.”79  Delegates Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts and 
Edmund Randolph of Virginia echoed the preference for executive authority 
over appointments.  Gorham observed that the “[e]xecutive would . . . be 
more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one 
would fall on him alone.”80  Randolph argued from his experience that 
“[a]ppointments by the Legislatures have generally resulted from cabal, from 




 77 James Madison, albeit one of its authors, described the Federalist Papers to Thomas Jefferson as 
“the most authentic exposition of the text of the federal Constitution, as understood by the Body 
which prepared & the Authority which accepted it.”  Letter from James Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 218 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 78 Notes of James Madison (June 5, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 79 Id. at 120. 
 80 Notes of James Madison (July 18, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS at 43. 
 81 Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS at 81. 
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Several delegates countered that the legislative branch should wield the 
appointment power.  But even they anchored their arguments, in part, on 
the suitability of that institution in choosing the appointees with the best 
qualifications.  Luther Martin of Maryland maintained that the Senate would 
be a better institution for identifying the most “fit” persons for the court 
because that institution was “taken from all the States” and would therefore 
be “best informed” of the candidates for the job.82  Roger Sherman and 
Elbridge Gerry each emphasized the same point.83  Oliver Ellsworth worried 
that the President’s stationary location—as distinguished from the Senate 
whose members would travel to their home states—would make the 
President “more open to caresses & intrigues than the Senate.”84  Of course, 
worries about consolidating too much power in the Executive also were also 
prevalent among that contingent.85  
Benjamin Franklin, who fell initially into neither camp, advocated for a 
process that would produce the most qualified candidates.  Franklin invited the 
Convention to consider what other institutions, beyond the executive and the 
legislature, might be empowered to appoint judges.  According to Madison’s 
notes, Franklin suggested in a “brief and entertaining manner” that fellow 
“Lawyers” should select jurists because in Scotland they “always selected the 
ablest of the profession in order to . . . share his practice (among themselves).”86 
But, as we know from the finished document, those contending that the 
Presidency was the institution most capable of identifying the most qualified 
candidates prevailed; Article II gave the President the power to both 
nominate and appoint.  It expressly gave the Senate only the power to 
counsel the President on his selections and either grant or withhold consent 
to them.  Notably, the initial draft presented to the Convention had 
empowered the “National Legislature” to choose the newly established 
“National Judiciary.”87  And many delegates opposed shifting the 
nomination power to the President.  But, as seen, even those delegates 
assumed that a primary goal of any constitutional design was to secure the 




 82 Notes of James Madison (July 18, 1787), supra note 80, at 41. 
 83 Id. at 41, 43 (Sherman); Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 80 (Gerry). 
 84 Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 81. 
 85 Id. at 81, 83 (George Mason: “He [Mason] considered the appointment by the Executive as a dangerous 
prerogative.”  Ellsworth: “The Executive will be regarded by the people with a jealous eye.”). 
 86 Notes of James Madison (June 5, 1787), supra note 78, at 119. 
 87 Id. 
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In Federalist No. 76, Alexander Hamilton defended Article II’s 
endowment of nomination authority to the President.  In so doing, he 
presumably sought to address the concerns of his audience: those considering 
whether the Constitution should be ratified.  Paralleling the focus of both 
factions at the Convention, Hamilton accepted that the institution best suited 
to select Supreme Court justices would be the one that could be most trusted 
to elevate qualifications above “partialities.”88  Hamilton advocated for the 
Presidency as the institution best suited to select qualified candidates because 
the “sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a 
livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”89  In articulating 
the deficiencies of the legislative branch, he observed: 
[I]n every exercise of the power of appointing offices by an assembly of men 
we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and 
dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are 
felt by those who compose the assembly. . . .  [T]he intrinsic merit of the 
candidate will be too often out of sight.  In the first, the qualifications best 
adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party will be more considered than 
those which fit the person for the station. . . .  And it will rarely happen that 
the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of 
party victories or of party negotiations.90 
Thus, he maintained that the constitutional text, by removing the Senate 
from the nomination process, would prevent a regime where partisan 
considerations would prevail over a candidate’s fitness for the post.   
It is also clear that the President’s nomination authority was understood 
by both its advocates and opponents as an important, exclusive power.  
Although Oliver Ellsworth argued that the nomination and appointment 
power should reside exclusively in the Senate, he recognized that giving the 
executive branch nomination authority, subject only to Senate veto, would 
mean that the President retained functional control over selection.  He 
warned: “A nomination under such circumstances will be equivalent to an 
appointment.”91  Luther Martin later complained that the President’s power 
to nominate was tantamount to the power of appointment, stating it gave 
 
 88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).   
 89 Id.  Although organized political parties had not yet emerged, the Constitution’s architects 
recognized both the inevitability and dangers of factionalism to governmental function.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 88, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A firm Union will be of the utmost 
moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction . . . .”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 88, at 122 (James Madison) (“Among the numerous advantages 
promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its 
tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”).  
 90 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 88, at 429. 
 91 Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 81. 
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him “a power and influence, which together with the other powers . . . would 
place him above all restraint and controul [sic]” and make him “a KING, in 
everything but the name.”92  In evaluating an earlier Convention proposal 
essentially identical in language to that eventually adopted by Article II, 
George Mason opined that such a design—providing exclusive power of 
nomination to the President with a Senate power to veto any nominee—
“substantially vested” the appointment power in the President “alone.”93 
Although opponents complained that Article II’s language made the 
power of nomination an exclusive prerogative of the President under the 
terms of Article II, Hamilton, a prominent advocate, agreed.  While 
describing the President’s contemplated authority under that article, 
Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 76 that: “In the act of nomination his 
judgment alone would be exercised.”94  In Federalist No. 77, Hamilton 
compared the Constitution’s design to New York’s own state process and 
observed: “In that plan [the Constitution’s] power of nomination is 
unequivocally vested in the executive.”95 
After ratification, the newly formed Senate debated which branch held 
the power to remove officers, a question not addressed in Article II.  
According to John Adams’s notes, two Senators commented that the 
President should have such power because the Constitution essentially gave 
the President the power to appoint.  Senator Ellsworth, a former opponent 
of that presidential power, stated: “The President, not the Senate, appoint 
[sic]; they only consent and advise.”96  And, Senator Read likewise construed 
Article II primarily vesting the power of appointment in the President.  “It is 
not an equal sharing of the power of appointment between the President and 
the Senate,” he observed.97  “The Senate are only a check to prevent 
impositions on the President.”98  
In his commentary on the powers conferred by Article II, Justice Story 
expressed this prevailing understanding: “The president is to nominate, and 
thereby has the sole power to select for office.”99  In the context of diplomatic 
appointments, Thomas Jefferson tersely summarized his understanding of 
 
 92 Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland (Nov. 29, 1787), in IV THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 27, 67 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 93 Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 83. 
 94 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 88, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 88, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 96 JOHN ADAMS, Notes of a Debate in the Senate, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 407, 409 (Charles 
Francis Adams ed., 1851). 
 97 Id. at 411–12. 
 98 Id. at 412. 
 99 3 JOSEPH STORY,  COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 376 (1833). 
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the extent of the Senate’s advice and consent power as follows: “They are 
only to see that no unfit person be employed.”100  As part of the same dispute, 
President George Washington accepted the counsel of James Madison, John 
Jay, and Thomas Jefferson that the Senate’s advice and consent authority 
was limited to the power of “approbation or disapprobation of the person 
nominated by the President, all the rest being Executive and vested in the 
President by the Constitution.”101  
In short, the Constitution’s framers, including proponents and opponents 
of the ultimate language set forth in Article II, strove to design an 
appointment process that would best elevate the candidate’s qualifications 
above partisan interests.  The majority of that body deliberately chose the 
Presidency over the Senate as the superior institution to effectuate that goal.  
For this reason, both the proponents and opponents of so empowering the 
executive branch understood that Article II was not contemplated to provide 
equal power to the Senate in either the nomination decision specifically or 
the appointment process as a whole.  Our nation’s most prominent 
governmental architects, including Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington, all read Article II, 
Section 2 in this way.   Any construction of the Advice and Consent Clause 
that would entitle the Senate to choose which judicial nominees it would 
consider, and thereby capture a concurrent power over nomination itself, 
and which could fully negate an individual President’s ability to appoint, 
would not be consistent with founding-era understandings of that text.  And 
the further premise—that the Senate might insist that the President’s 
nomination authority be subject to ideological review by voters in an 
intervening election—would have been squarely at odds with the Framers’ 
unanimous intent to design an appointment system focused only on 
qualifications and resistant to factional political influence. 
The founding-era record also suggests that the Appointments Clause was 
understood to include express and implied procedural checks on both the 
President and the Senate.  Of course, the President’s textually exclusive 
powers to nominate and appoint describe express limitations on Senate 
authority.  Meanwhile, the Senate’s power to withhold consent stands as the 
lone textual limitation on a President’s discretion in appointing judges.  But 
important founding-era constitutional theorists also contemplated how these 
respective checks would function in practice. 
 
 100 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 30 NOVEMBER 1789–4 JULY 1790, at 379 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961). 
 101 GEORGE WASHINGTON, Diary Entry of Tuesday, 27th (April 27, 1790), in THE DIARY OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, FROM 1789 TO 1791, at 128 (Benson J. Lossing ed., 1861). 
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In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton explained that the President’s power to 
nominate, and the Senate’s duty to consider the nominee, stood central to 
the separation of powers calibration.  Hamilton dismissed concerns that the 
Senate’s “consent” power might allow that body to assume ultimate control 
over judicial appointments.  He observed that “[t]he Senate could not be 
tempted by the preference . . . to reject the one proposed[ ] [by the President] 
because they could not assure themselves that the person they might wish 
would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination.”102  
Of course, Hamilton’s above notion assumes a Senate that will actually 
consider the merits of nominated candidates. 
As Hamilton explained, the political enforcement of checks and balances 
would occur through the faithful discharge of the consideration process itself.  
That process would assure that: “The blame of a bad nomination would fall 
upon the President singly and absolutely.  The censure of rejecting a good 
one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate, aggravated by the 
consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the 
executive.”103  Hamilton contemplated the President’s power to nominate, 
and the Senate’s concomitant duty to consider any nominee, as necessary 
checks to prevent the Senate from securing functional control over the 
appointment process. 
Joseph Story, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1811 to 
1845, and an early scholar on the meaning of the new Constitution, sought 
in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, to “bring[ ] before the 
reader the true view of [the Constitution’s] powers, maintained by its 
founders and friends.”104  Therein, he analyzed the respective powers of the 
Chief Executive and the Senate in the appointment process.  He specifically 
explained how the appointment process was understood to function when 
the Senate rejected a nominee: “[I]n case of a rejection, the most that, can 
be said, is, that he [the President] had not his first choice.  He will still have 
a wide range of selection; and his responsibility to present another candidate, 
entirely qualified for the office, will be complete and unquestionable.”105  
That the Senate would be duty-bound to consider the President’s nominee is 
implicit in Story’s functional understanding of the text.  If, instead, the Senate 
were permitted to refuse to consider any nominee, the President’s duty to 
present another candidate would not be “complete and unquestionable” but 
 
 102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 88, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 88, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 104 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES viii 
(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873). 
 105 3 STORY, supra note 99, at 377. 
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rather irrelevant and non-existent. 
Nor did Story envision any risk of dysfunction presented by the Senate’s 
advice and consent power.  In his view, the consideration process would 
subject the Senate to public scorn if it rejected a qualified candidate: 
Nor is it to be expected, that the senate will ordinarily fail of ratifying the 
appointment of a suitable person for the office.  Independent of the desire, 
which such a body may naturally be presumed to feel, of having offices 
suitably filled . . . there will be a responsibility to public opinion for a 
rejection, which will overcome all common private wishes.106 
But the Senate would be shielded from the scorn arising from rejecting a 
“suitable person” if it refuses to consider any nominee and claims, as it did 
with respect to Judge Garland, that such refusal has nothing to do with the 
nominee’s qualifications. 
Story understood Article II to be energized by the mutual duties imposed 
on the President and the Senate.  In explaining why the Senate would not 
predictably succumb to a President’s political pressure to appoint unfit 
nominees, Story expressed confidence that the senators’ sense of “duty to 
their country” would encourage the “firm discharge of their duty [to provide 
advice and consent] on such occasions.”107  He explained why the Senate 
could not exert undue influence over the President: “It is certain, that the 
senate cannot, by their refusal to confirm the nominations of the president, 
prevent him from the proper discharge of his duty.”108  But, if the Senate 
need not consider the President’s nominees at all as the 114th Senate 
claimed, they could—and did—achieve precisely that. 
Read together, Hamilton and Story’s assumptions about how the 
contemplated checks on Senate authority over appointments would function 
all presuppose that Article II imposes an obligation on the Senate to consider 
a President’s individual nominees to assess their qualifications.  This is so 
whether the check is enforced by the President’s ability to serially nominate 
candidates, by the leverage of the public opinion when a qualified candidate 
is rejected, or by the assumption that both branches possess a duty to execute 
the purposes of the Appointments Clause. 
In addressing a novel constitutional dispute about the mechanics of 
diplomatic appointments in 1790, Thomas Jefferson worried that the Senate 
might attempt to interfere with the President’s executive management of 
appointees by refusing to confirm any nominee whose assignment defied the 
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Senate’s organizational preference: 
It may be objected that the Senate may, by continual negatives on the 
person, do what amounts to a negative on the grade; and so indirectly defeat 
this right of the President.  But this would be a breach of trust, an abuse of 
the power confided to the Senate, of which that body cannot be supposed 
capable.109 
Here, Jefferson characterizes the Senate’s use of a de facto power to 
persistently withhold consent (“continual negatives on the person”) as “an 
abuse of the power” when deployed to capture greater authority than 
specified by Article II.  Jefferson refers to another express presidential power 
to further illustrate the point: 
So the President has the power to convoke the legislature; and the Senate 
might defeat that power by refusing to come.  This equally amounts to a 
negative on the power of convoking.  Yet nobody will say they possess such 
a negative, or would be capable of usurping it by such oblique means.  If the 
Constitution had meant to give the Senate a negative on the grade or 
destination, as well as the person, it would have said so in direct terms, and 
not left it to be effected by a sidewind.  It could never mean to give them the 
use of one power thro[ugh] the abuse of another.110 
Thus, Jefferson rejected any construction of the Appointments Clause that 
divines Senate authority from the combination of constitutional silence and 
de facto procedural leverage.  Jefferson understood the Senate’s advice and 
consent role to imply no additional power over the appointment process 
beyond an evaluation of the nominee’s fitness for the post.  In the same 
argument, Jefferson describes the Senate’s role as a limited one, specifically, 
“to see that no unfit person be employed.”111 
Under Jefferson’s view, then, the Senate’s advice and consent role cannot 
be construed to imply Senate control over the identity of the nominees who 
will be considered, over the timing of the process, or over the identity of the 
Presidents who may select nominees.  Professor Somin’s suggestion—that the 
Senate may functionally capture such dramatic extra-textual authority 
because the text fails to expressly prohibit it from doing so—was not a 
constitutional construction favored by Thomas Jefferson.  As Jefferson 
observed, the Constitution does not textually empower the Senate to capture 
“one power thro[ugh] the abuse of another.”112  To paraphrase Jefferson’s 
view of Senate appointment authority: if the Constitution had been designed 
to provide the Senate with such a dominant role over appointments through 
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its advice and consent authority, “it would have said so in direct terms.”113 
In summary, a review of the record of the Constitutional Convention, the 
Federalist Papers, and the writings of prominent founding-era scholars 
strongly suggest: (1) that the Framers strove to create a process for judicial 
appointment that elevated a candidate’s qualifications for the post above the 
self-interest of the selecting body; (2) that the Presidency, rather than the 
Senate, was deliberately chosen as the best institution to effectuate that goal; 
(3) that the President’s ultimate authority to serially nominate candidates and 
the consideration process mandated by “advice and consent” would function 
as a necessary counterweight to a Senate’s ability to otherwise capture the 
appointment power; and (4) that the Senate’s advice and consent role was 
neither understood to compromise the President’s exclusive authority over 
selection nor to provide the Senate dominant authority over the appointment 
process. 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Evaluated by “plain text” standards, the 114th Senate’s refusal to 
consider the President’s nominee was a violation of constitutional design:  the 
Senate’s claim of such authority can neither be harmonized with plain 
constitutional directive expressed in Article II, Section 2 or founding-era 
understandings of that text.  Nonetheless, the Senate’s claim functionally 
prevailed, resulting in a dramatic political victory for the Republican Party 
that will likely carry substantial long-term implications for the shape of 
American jurisprudence. 
More troubling yet, this Article demonstrates that, on the question of 
whether the Senate possesses some duty to consider a President’s nominees, 
the issue does not present a “close case.” 
The text of Article II, Section 2 expressly provides the President with the 
exclusive authority to nominate candidates.  Yet, the 114th Senate captured 
an extra-textual power over nomination by claiming it possessed the final 
authority to decide who would be considered and under what circumstances. 
The text describes an obligatory three-step process for appointing 
important governmental officials.  The Senate claimed that it owed no duty 
to discharge its advice and consent role as to an individual nominee, the 
necessary second step in that process. 
The text expressly authorizes Presidents to fill government posts when 
the Senate is not in session, elevating the value of prompt appointment over 
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Senate consideration.  The Senate claimed the unilateral power to 
indefinitely delay appointments by withholding consideration for over a year 
and through the changing of elected Senate bodies. 
The text locates the Appointments Clause in Article II, Section 2 among 
the Constitution’s enumeration of presidential powers and expressly 
describes two of the three steps of that process as powers of the President.  
The 114th Senate nonetheless viewed itself as broadly empowered to 
determine who would be considered (the power of nomination), to enjoy 
complete control over the timing of any appointment, and thereby to delay 
the appointment process until a subsequent President took power.    
The text semantically confines the Senate’s advice and consent authority 
to a review of the nominee already chosen by the President.  The Senate read 
these same eight words as authorizing it to constructively eviscerate an 
individual President’s power to effectively nominate at all.  Indeed, the text 
fails to describe any Senate authority in the appointment context beyond the 
Senate’s limited advice and consent role.  Yet, the Senate construed this 
silence as permission to dominate the appointment process altogether. 
The Constitution’s hostility to the Senate’s claim of authority is 
confirmed by a review of the record of the Constitutional Convention, the 
Federalist Papers, and other writings of influential founding-era 
constitutional commentators.  Those documents demonstrate that the 
Appointments Clause was originally understood in conformity with the 
obligatory process that clause describes for filling governmental vacancies.  
The Senate’s claim, that it may indefinitely delay and dominate the process, 
thereby trivializing an elected President’s role, would have surprised the 
architects, promoters, and adopters of the Constitution. 
This is because those who drafted, debated, and ratified Article II 
believed they had bestowed the primary authority over appointments on the 
President.  They believed they had provided only a limited veto power to the 
Senate.  They believed they had endowed the President, not the Senate, with 
the exclusive and important prerogative to nominate and appoint.  They 
believed the Appointments Clause installed inherent limits on the Senate’s 
potential abuse of their advice and consent authority.  Specifically, they 
understood the President’s power to have his nominees serially considered as 
an important and necessary check on the Senate.  Otherwise, they feared the 
Senate might reject qualified nominees out of cynical self-interest—which is 
arguably what the 114th Senate did. 
In short, the 114th Senate’s claim of authority, to the extent based on 
fidelity to the United States Constitution, is not a correct one.  A 
comprehensive review of Article II, Section 2 demonstrates the Senate’s 
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inaction violated both the letter of, and purpose conveyed by, the 
Appointments Clause. 
Not all constitutional disputes invite a multitude of plausible 
constructions.  As Jack Balkin observes, it takes little practical or evaluative 
judgment to apply Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution.114  That provision 
reads:  “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State.”115  By contrast, reasonable constitutional scholars might 
differ on which constitutional principles, and tools of construction, should be 
marshalled to define “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Balkin thus draws a distinction among constitutional rules, 
standards, and principles—constitutional requirements set forth in different 
levels of abstraction—in evaluating the amount of interpretation or 
construction necessary to resolve a constitutional question.116 
Here, we have scrutinized constitutional text that sets forth a procedural 
rule for filling vacancies on the United States Supreme Court: the 
Appointments Clause.  That language, while subject to more interpretive 
leeway than Article I, Section 3, is sufficiently concrete to markedly limit the 
range of plausible interpretations of that language.  Indeed, this Article 
submits that a searching review of the unadorned text of Article II, Section 
2, conducted with reference to the full implications of the Senate’s claim of 
authority, confirmed by founding-era understandings of that language, can 
produce only one plausible verdict: that the Senate’s complete refusal to 
consider President Obama’s nominee was an assertion of raw political will in 
violation of the Constitution. 
But, if a Senate majority has the express constitutional power to 
ultimately withhold consent after consideration, does it functionally matter 
that the Constitution prohibits the Senate from withholding consideration?  
It should.  Justice Antonin Scalia, eulogized by contemporary political 
conservatives like those in the Senate majority, spent his career maintaining 
that rigorous fidelity to constitutional design is necessary to promote 
enduring democratic values.  As if chiding Senator McConnell from beyond 
the grave, Justice Scalia observed: “A system of democratically adopted laws 
cannot endure—it makes no sense—without the belief that words convey 
discernible meanings and without the commitment of legal arbiters to abide 
by those meanings.”117  Notably, the United States Constitution itself, apart 
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FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 251 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcom Thorburn eds., 
2016). 
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from the Bill of Rights, contains little substantive law.  It is mostly concerned 
with establishing a procedural framework for the conduct of a democracy, 
with its primary tool the separation of powers.  The Senate’s disregard for 
that framework—when the partisan stakes were especially high—was a 
rejection of the animating premise of that document. 
Furthermore, an institutional recognition that the Constitution demands 
Senate consideration of nominees would also have concrete effects on the 
nomination of federal district and circuit court judges.  As to such judges, 
both Senate factions have refused to consider nominees for those posts during 
the last year of a President’s term.  This Article brings the lawfulness of that 
practice into question—at least to the extent the processes for those 
appointments are viewed as controlled by Article II, Section 2 and to the 
extent the Senate has the time remaining in its session to feasibly conduct an 
advice and consent process. 
Even if one contends that the ultimate enforcer of constitutional fidelity 
must be the public, on the battleground of the electoral process, the 
Constitution has designed the terms of that engagement.  To justify their 
refusal to consider any nominee of President Obama, the Senate made the 
political claim that it was harnessing a power that the Constitution provided 
it, and that it was doing so in a fashion with the most deference to democratic 
ideals: let the voters decide in the upcoming election!  Setting aside the 
question of whether a presidential election can reasonably be viewed as a 
referendum on a single judicial appointment, this was a posture the Senate 
was not constitutionally entitled to strike. 
In essence, the Senate made a claim of fidelity to democratic ideals when 
it was instead violating the Constitution’s rules for conducting our republican 
government.  While the voting public might not have the patience to parse 
the above textual arguments which demonstrate that fact, the names 
Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and James 
Madison carry considerable prestige among the lay public as arbiters of 
constitutional design.  Each of them accepted that the Constitution endowed 
the President, not the Senate, with the dominant role in selecting and 
appointing Justices to the United States Supreme Court.  For this reason, 
reference to unanimous founding-era understandings of text might plausibly 
have elevated the importance of correct constitutional process in the public 
mind and intimidated senators seeking re-election to conform to that process.  
This was especially so given that Republican Senate leadership had 
specifically praised Justice Scalia’s adherence to founding-era understandings 
of text in explaining why the process for choosing his replacement should 
await an intervening election.    
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Let us suppose the 2016 election had occurred with the threshold public 
understanding that the Senate’s refusal to consider any nominee of President 
Obama’s was a violation of the law or, at minimum, a defiance of our 
constitutional Founders’ understandings of separation of powers.  Under 
such circumstances, any political referendum, especially as to the election of 
embattled Republican Senators, might have told a different tale.118  And, in 
prospectively contemplating those political risks, those Senators might have 
prevailed on their caucus to allow consideration of Judge Garland.   
Furthermore, had the Senate abided by constitutional design and 
considered President Obama’s nominees, the Senate leadership may not 
have been able to control the votes of its caucus.  The political calculation of 
Republican Senators, especially those facing re-election, may have changed 
had they been (1) required to individually reject a moderate and qualified 
Justice; (2) after that Justice had been humanized during the theater of public 
hearings; and (3) knowing that his rejection would only set the stage for 
another confirmation process for another nominee: one perhaps hailing from 
the Senator’s home state with a compelling personal narrative.119 
The above reputational pressures on individual Senators were the very 
checks that Alexander Hamilton and Justice Story envisioned as necessary to 
prevent the rejection of qualified nominees on inappropriate partisan 
grounds.  In this way, correct understandings of constitutional mandates 
place political actions in appropriate context.  The constitutional procedure 
at issue here, carefully devised to balance government function with checks 
on power, was designed to do precisely that. 
Although the results of this analysis may place the actions of the 114th 
Senate in harsh light, this article’s interpretive framework—an evaluation of 
the instant constitutional problem with primary reference to a semantic 
analysis of the text—conforms to the interpretive approach fervently 
 
 118 Republican incumbents, Senators Pat Toomey, Roy Blunt, and Ron Johnson of Pennsylvania, 
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preached by Justice Scalia and for which he was eulogized by the leadership 
of that Senate.  However, the author has not chosen those interpretive tools 
here primarily to expose political hypocrisy.    
Instead, the foregoing analysis seeks terra firma.  Acknowledging the 
primacy of the text offends no prevailing modality of constitutional 
interpretation.  Indeed, the competing theories of construction become 
relevant only when such language fails to resolve a constitutional question.  
For this reason, when we strive to identify indisputable semantic 
understandings of constitutional text, we stand on neutral interpretive turf.  
Such conclusions from text, in those cases when they are available and 
discernible, have the potential to provide the concrete constitutional rules 
that are necessary for our democracy to function—even when the political 
motivation to evade them is especially acute.  
 
 
